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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., I saw the
original manuscript of the joint resolution of Congress proposing the
14th Amendment.1  The cursive script and faded ink made the words
difficult to read, but the force of the words was manifest:
. . . [no] State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.2
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality, Seattle University School of Law. Copyright © 2019 Robert S. Chang. This Essay was
written at the invitation of the Thurgood Marshall Institute of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
as part of a planned volume to commemorate the sesquicentennial of the passage of the 14th
Amendment. This volume did not come to be. I am grateful for the careful editing of this Essay
provided by LDF Senior Counsel Cody Montag and their legal intern, Terrence Hunger of the
University of Mississippi School of Law.
1. 14th Amendment, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (July 9, 1968), https://archive.org/details/
14thAmendment/mode/2up.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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These words had recently gained a newfound importance for me
as I had just become co-counsel representing high school students in
Arizona.  In that case, Arce v. Douglas, the students challenged a state
statute that had been used to terminate their school district’s Mexican
American Studies program.3  The students alleged that the statute had
been enacted and enforced in violation of their rights under the 14th
Amendment, among other claims.4  Not to give too much away, but
after six years, the students finally prevailed.5
Previously, the 14th Amendment’s words had existed as more of
an abstraction for me, something that I wrote about in law review arti-
cles, often to criticize the myriad ways the United States Supreme
Court had limited the reach of those words.6  My academic work on
the 14th Amendment, until then, had also included an examination of
how Asian Americans fit within constitutional jurisprudence.7  This
work required comparisons of different racial groups and how they
navigated the complex and treacherous terrain of race in the United
States.8  This academic work provided context for me when I litigated
the 14th Amendment in the courtroom, which resulted in a newfound
appreciation of the amendment.
This Essay examines my evolving perception of and engagement
with the 14th Amendment.  It begins with an academic perspective on
the 14th Amendment, then turns to the 14th Amendment and Asian
Americans, followed by an examination of a transformative experi-
ence litigating the 14th Amendment.  Through these experiences, I
have conceptualized some thoughts about how to make the 14th
Amendment come alive for the next generation of lawyers.
AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE 14TH AMENDMENT
One of the most pernicious pronouncements that limited the
reach of the powerful words contained in the 14th Amendment oc-
curred fifteen years after its ratification, when the Supreme Court, in
3. Certain details about the case can be gleaned from the published opinions in the case.
See Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2015); see also González v. Douglas, 269 F.
Supp. 3d 948, 964 (D. Ariz. 2017). Discussed further infra Part III.
4. González, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 950.
5. Id. at 974.
6. E.g., Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Nothing and Everything: Race, Romer,
and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 229 (1997).
7. See generally ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE
NATION-STATE (1999).
8. E.g., Robert S. Chang & Neil Gotanda, Afterword: The Race Question in LatCrit Theory
and Asian American Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 1012 (2007).
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the Civil Rights Cases, invalidated legislation passed by Congress to
ensure access and enjoyment of inns, public conveyances, and places
of public amusement for persons of color.9  The chief problem with
the legislation, at least with regard to the 14th Amendment, was that it
interfered not with discrimination by state or local governments but
with acts of discrimination by private individuals, which the Court
deemed to be mere private wrongs.10  The Court thought that parties
injured by private actors should seek redress under state law, noting
that “[i]nnkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the [s]tates, so
far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to
furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in
good faith apply for them.”11  The Court made clear, though, that the
injured party was not to turn to Congress for relief.12  In a particularly
cruel passage, expressed with no sense of irony, Justice Joseph P.
Bradley stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favor-
ite of the laws . . . .13
I am unsure if those who emerged from slavery ever went
through a period of feeling that they were the special favorites of the
law, or, now elevated and armed with their equal status as citizens, felt
that they needed nothing further from Congress or the courts.
Despite this problematic language, in demarcating private acts of
discrimination as beyond the reach of Congress, the Court did make a
broad pronouncement: If state laws “make any unjust discrimination,”
the 14th Amendment would afford relief.14  In 1896, the Court got a
chance to determine what exactly it meant by these words in its
landmark decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, which established the doc-
trine of “separate but equal.”15  The challenge in Plessy arose from an
1890 Louisiana law requiring “separate railway carriages for the white
and colored races.”16  Homer Plessy challenged the law in court, argu-
9. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19 (1883).
10. Id. at 17.




15. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. Id. at 540.
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ing that the “enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority,”17 violating the 14th Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection.  The Supreme Court rejected his argu-
ments.  In his majority opinion, Justice Henry Billings wrote: “If . . .
[enforced separation stamps the colored race with the badge of inferi-
ority], it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely be-
cause the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”18  In
other words, the Court told black people that any negative impact
they felt from the requirement to sit in separate cars was entirely of
their own creation and not the concern of the Court.  “Separate but
equal” became all that racial minorities could expect from the 14th
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.
The Court’s decision in Plessy robbed the 14th Amendment of its
meaning and power until the mid-20th century when Charles Hamil-
ton Houston and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. (“LDF”) breathed new life into it through a series of court chal-
lenges that led to the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board
of Education19 and beyond.20
These court challenges also led to a less well-known, but very im-
portant result: something that has been termed the reverse incorpora-
tion of the 14th Amendment’s equal protection guarantee into the 5th
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  A companion case to Brown, the
Supreme Court case Bolling v. Sharpe addressed segregated public
schools in Washington, D.C.21  Because D.C. public schools were seg-
regated by federal authorities, the 14th Amendment was not available
to protect the plaintiffs.  Chief Justice Earl Warren, while acknowledg-
ing that “equal protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,”22 and that the two
are not always interchangeable,23 nevertheless found that an equal
protection guarantee is included within the 5th Amendment’s due
process guarantee:
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro chil-
17. Id. at 551.
18. Id.
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. A discussion of this decades-long series of cases is beyond the scope of this chapter. For
an excellent account, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977).
21. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
22. Id. at 499.
23. Id.
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dren of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbi-
trary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process
Clause.24
Before Bolling, the guarantee of equal protection of the laws did
not apply to the federal government.  All manner of mischief was
made possible because the federal government was not constrained by
this guarantee.  The institution of slavery, enshrined in the original
Constitution, was made possible because the federal government was
not bound by equal protection.  Likewise, the lack of a federal equal
protection guarantee permitted the disenfranchisement of women25
and the dispossession, displacement, and extermination of Indians.26
Moreover, because the federal government is not constrained by an
equal protection guarantee, the federal government was able to limit
naturalization to free white persons in the 1790 Naturalization Act.27
The lack of a federal equal protection guarantee also resulted in
discrimination against Asians.  For example, the lack of said guarantee
might be considered to be partially responsible for permitting the fed-
eral government to determine, in the late nineteenth century, that
most classes of Chinese persons could not enter the country and that
no Chinese immigrant could become a United States citizen.28  It also
led to the policy that Chinese immigrants who wanted to leave the
24. Id. at 500.
25. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (stating that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex”).
Had there been a federal equal protection guarantee, presumably there would have been no
need for this amendment.
26. Two early cases established the unique relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15, 20 (1831) (because the Chero-
kee Nation was not a foreign state, Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate bill “brought by the
Cherokee Nation, praying an injunction to restrain the State of Georgia from the execution of
certain laws of that State which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a politi-
cal society and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the [Cherokee] Nation which have
been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in
force”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (while the Cherokee Nation retained
internal sovereignty, its relationship with federal government was that of a “distinct, indepen-
dent political communit[y]”). Even if there had been a federal equal protection guarantee at the
time, the fact that the relationship was political would have precluded its application to the
treatment of Indian tribes by the United States. Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52
(1974) (plenary power held by Congress largely precludes equal protection as “[l]iterally every
piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single out for special treat-
ment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws . . . were
deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.)
would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians
would be jeopardized.”) (citation omitted).
27. NATURALIZATION ACT OF 1790 § 1, 1 STAT. 103; see Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S.
178, 194–95 (1922).
28. CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT, PUB. L. NO. 47-126, 22 STAT. 58, 58–61 (1882).
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United States temporarily had to obtain certificates for reentry and
that these same duly issued certificates could, with the stroke of a pen,
be nullified.29  It resulted in the statute requiring Chinese immigrants,
who were lawfully present in the United States, to have and carry cer-
tificates to prove their lawful presence or face deportation.30  Pursuant
to that law, a white witness needed to vouch for the Chinese laborer in
order for the certificate to be valid.31  The federal government could
limit the right of naturalization to white persons and persons of Afri-
can nativity or descent, such that a lawful immigrant of Japanese or
South Asian ancestry, who otherwise met the requirements to become
a naturalized citizen, could be denied naturalization.32  All manner of
mischief.
The principle that the federal government was not bound to pro-
vide equal protection of the laws was invoked by the Court during
World War II as part of the justification of a curfew that applied only
to persons of Japanese ancestry, including those who were United
States citizens.  In Hirabayashi v. United States, Chief Justice Harlan
F. Stone rejected Gordon Hirabayashi’s argument that discrimination
against citizens of Japanese ancestry violated the 5th Amendment,
noting: “The Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause
and it restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as
amounts to a denial of due process.”33  In the Court’s view, the curtail-
ment of Hirabayashi’s liberty interest by a curfew restricting only per-
sons of Japanese ancestry, citizen or not, did not amount to a denial of
due process.34  As Justice Stone made clear, at stake in Hirabayashi
was merely a curfew, suggestive that a greater curtailment of liberty
might violate due process.35
That may be what Fred Korematsu hoped for when he pursued
his challenge to the military order that required him to leave his home
for the government’s incarceration camps for Japanese Americans.  In
Korematsu v. United States, in an opinion written by Justice Hugo
Black, the Court largely ignored that the liberty interest at issue was
far greater than that in Hirabayashi, and expressed that “all legal re-
29. Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582, 609 (1889).
30. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 742 (1893).
31. Id.
32. See generally United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 207–8 (1923); see also Ozawa, 260
U.S. at 198.
33. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
34. Id. at 99–101.
35. Id. at 112–14.
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strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are im-
mediately suspect . . . [and] that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny.”36  Yet, the Court concluded that “Korematsu was not
excluded . . . because of hostility to him or his race,” but instead “was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire.”37  That we
were at war with Italy and Germany and those of Italian and German
ancestry were not similarly burdened could be ignored because the
federal government, not constrained by an equal protection mandate,
was at greater liberty to discriminate.
The civil rights movement, especially the challenges to segregated
education, led to a reinvigoration of the 14th Amendment, including
expanding its equal protection guarantee to apply to the federal gov-
ernment.38  This was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.39  Like
the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1875, these new civil rights acts were
challenged in court.  For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, the appellant motel challenged the constitutionality of Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, arguing that Congress lacked the
power under the Commerce Clause40 to prohibit it from refusing to
rent rooms on the basis of race.41  The Court, however, rejected this
argument, making it abundantly clear that “equal access to public es-
tablishments . . . could be readily achieved by congressional action
based on the commerce power of the Constitution.”42
But unlike prior cases, when the power of the federal government
to make good on the promises of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amend-
ments was largely circumscribed, the 1960s civil rights acts were
largely upheld by the Supreme Court.43  This was no surprise given
that the Court was led at the time by Chief Justice Earl Warren, who
had a liberal majority and effectively overruled Plessy with the deci-
sion in Brown.  But then the Warren Court became the Burger Court.
36. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
37. Id. at 223.
38. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
39. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, PUB. L. NO. 88-352, 78 STAT. 241 (1964); VOTING RIGHTS
ACT OF 1965, PUB. L. NO. 89-110, 79 STAT. 437 (1965); FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968, PUB. L. 90-
284, 82 STAT. 73 (1968).
40. COMMERCE CLAUSE, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243–44 (1964).
42. Id. at 250.
43. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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President Nixon, elected in 1968, remade the Supreme Court with
four appointments in approximately 18 months during his first term in
office, replacing Earl Warren with Warren Burger, Abe Fortas with
Harry Blackmun, Hugo Black with Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and John
Marshall Harlan II with William Rehnquist.44
This reshaped — and more conservative — Court began disman-
tling the reach of the 14th Amendment in the 1970s, either directly or
by limiting the reach of civil rights statutes intended to fulfill its prom-
ise.  Discrimination had to have been intentional;45 there were strict
causation requirements such that remedial measures could be justified
only if there was “prior discrimination by the government unit in-
volved:”46 and remedies for statutory violations were limited.  In addi-
tion, remedies were limited in order to not harm so-called innocent
white people, whose undeserved settled expectations from seniority
systems locked into place the effects of past discrimination.47
The Burger Court greatly limited the power of federal courts to
fulfill the promise of Brown.  For example, in Milliken v. Bradley, the
Court made clear that remedies to redress school segregation would
be carefully examined so that any remedy did not exceed the scope of
the constitutional violation.48  The immediate effect in that case was to
invalidate an interdistrict remedy because the only constitutional vio-
lation established before the district court stemmed from segregation
within the Detroit City School District.49  Justice Thurgood Marshall,
in dissent, asserted that the problem of white flight cannot be ignored
and that the practical effect of the majority’s decision would be that
“[t]he very evil Brown I was aimed at will not be cured, but will be
perpetuated for the future.”50
I attended law school between 1989 and 1992 and learned the
language of feminist legal theory and critical race theory to under-
stand this slow demolition of the civil rights gains of the earlier period
and labeled the new era as the Second Redemption or post-civil rights
44. See Warren Weaver, Jr., Four Nixon Justices Vote as Bloc on 70% of Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1973, at 20; Thomas Healy, A Supreme Legacy: The Conservative Legacy of the Burger
Court Lives on in the Precedents It Set, NATION (June 23, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/arti
cle/archive/a-supreme-legacy/.
45. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
46. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
47. Id. at 276.
48. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 802 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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era.51  As an academic, I wrote about this earlier historical period as a
way to understand the retrenchment of civil rights I observed take
place following what has been described as the Second Reconstruction
embodied by the 1960s civil rights acts.  I saw in Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s words echoes of Justice Brown, who declared in Plessy
that any feeling of inferiority experienced by members of the colored
race was in their heads.
For example, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, the
Supreme Court held that Richmond’s failure to identify past illegal
conduct as the basis for its “Minority Business Utilization Plan” for
awarding public construction contracts to its citizens violated the
Equal Protection Clause.52  The fact that 99.33% of government con-
struction contracts went to white-owned businesses in a city that was
more than 50% black was not a sufficient factual predicate to justify
Richmond’s program requirement that 30% of government construc-
tion contracts be awarded to minority-owned businesses.53  Justice
O’Connor, noting that statistical disparity cannot by itself establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, states, blithely, “Blacks may be dis-
proportionately attracted to industries other than construction.”54  For
Justice O’Connor, the notion that this disparity is reflective of discrim-
ination might simply be in the heads of black people because, after all,
they may just not prefer the construction trade.  Likewise, we may
look at corporate boardrooms today and say that black people may be
disproportionately attracted to lower positions in corporations, and
that any notion that the lack of diversity is a product of discrimination
is, as Justice Brown wrote in Plessy, “because the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it.”55
Justice O’Connor also channeled Justice Bradley (who declared
in the Civil Rights Cases that black people were no longer to be the
special favorites of the law)56 in a key decision on the use of affirma-
51. E.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2206 n.284 (1992)
(listing “at least 12 themes reflected in the move from the civil rights era of the mid-1960s to the
present post-civil-rights era”); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Re-cognizing Inequality: Rebellion, Re-
demption and the Struggle for Transcendence in the Equal Protection of the Law, 27 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 97, 57 (1991) (describing retrenchment of civil rights as “apparent triumph of the
second Redemption”).
52. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989).
53. Id. at 479.
54. Id. at 503.
55. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
56. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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tive action programs by universities.  In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Su-
preme Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s
affirmative action program but emphasized that it must be tempo-
rary.57  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, emphasized that it
had been twenty-five years since the Court gave its blessing in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke to “use race to further an in-
terest in student body diversity in the context of higher education,”
but that “[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial prefer-
ences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved to-
day.”58  Implicit in her opinion was the view that underrepresented
racial minorities get to “enjoy” their privileged status as special favor-
ites of the law for just a little while longer.59  The sunsetting of affirm-
ative action reflects a worldview within which the time must come
when the uplifted minorities have to stand for themselves and can no
longer rely on the beneficence of affirmative action, no longer able to
be the special favorites of the law.
This is the 14th Amendment that I knew as an academic.
THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND ASIAN AMERICANS
As an Asian American, I have a complicated relationship with
the 14th Amendment, because it only partially incorporated persons
of Asian ancestry into its protections.  Though its due process and
equal protection guarantees extended to any person, its first sentence,
the so-called Citizenship Clause, only partially incorporated people
who looked like me into the national body.  I say partially incorpo-
rated because the federal government remained free to discriminate
to restrict naturalization on the basis of race and national origin.60  In
this section, I first discuss due process and equal protection before
turning to the incomplete Citizenship Clause.
The last two clauses of section one of the 14th Amendment state:
“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”61  The import of “any person”
57. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
58. Id. at 343.
59. Id. (“We take the Law School at its word that it would ‘like nothing better than to find a
race-neutral admissions formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as
soon as practicable.”).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
61. Id.
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is discussed in the Slaughter-House Cases.62 In Justice Samuel Miller’s
majority opinion, after observing that the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amend-
ments specifically pertained to black people, he stated:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this pro-
tection. Both the language and spirit of these Articles are to have
their fair and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubt-
edly, while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress
which proposed the Thirteenth Article, it forbids any other kind of
slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie
labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race
within our territory, this Amendment may safely be trusted to make
it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States, which prop-
erly and necessarily fall within the protection of these Articles, that
protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of Af-
rican descent.63
The Court got a chance to test its commitment to this proposition
in its decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.64  That case involved a San
Francisco ordinance that permitted laundries to be operated with no
restriction if housed in a brick or stone structure but required the writ-
ten consent of the city Board of Supervisors to operate a laundry in
other structures.65  On its face, the ordinance did not discriminate.66
The problem arose when the Board began granting and withholding
consent.67  After the passage of the statute, Yick Wo, Wo Lee, and 200
other persons of Chinese ancestry petitioned the Board for permission
to continue operating laundries in their wooden structures, which
many of them had been using for over twenty years.68  They were all
denied.69  Eighty others who operated laundries in wooden structures,
none of whom were Chinese, were granted permission by the board to
continue operations.70  Only one non-Chinese person, Mrs. Mary
Meagles, was denied permission.71
Yick Wo and Wo Lee refused to pay the fines for violating the
ordinance and were placed in jail.72  They filed suit in state court seek-
62. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
63. Id. at 72.
64. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
65. Id. at 368.
66. Id. at 373–74.
67. Id. at 366.
68. Id. at 374.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 473–74 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
72. In re Yick Wo, 9 P. 139 (Cal. 1885).
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ing habeas relief.73  After losing in the California Supreme Court, they
appealed initially to the Circuit Court for the District of California.74
The circuit court appeared to acknowledge that “[t]he necessary ten-
dency, if not the specific purpose, of this ordinance, and of enforcing it
in the manner indicated in the record, is to drive out of business all the
numerous small laundries, especially those owned by Chinese, and
give a monopoly of the business to the large institutions established
and carried on by means of large associated Caucasian capital.”75  Yet
it chose to defer to the “greater weight of judicial authority in this
state” by upholding the ordinance, but expressed hope that “both par-
ties and the United States [S]upreme [C]ourt will co-operate to pro-
cure a speedy decision.”76
The Supreme Court quickly took up the review.  As a threshold
matter, the Court made clear, early in its opinion, that the fact that
Yick Wo was a subject of the emperor of China was irrelevant for
purposes of the due process and equal protection provisions of the
14th Amendment.77  It stated that “[t]hese provisions are universal in
their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, with-
out regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality, and
the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws.”78  Because Yick Wo was protected by the 14th Amendment, the
defendants had to answer the substantive charge of discrimination.
The attorneys for the defendants argued:
Why should we want to destroy the [C]hinese laundry business?  Do
we not voluntarily give them our clothes to wash?  Have we not
given them three-fourths of the laundry business of San Francisco?
We take them into our families as cooks and butlers, and into our
churches and [S]unday-schools, and they sleep with us (temporarily)
in our cemeteries.79
The Court rejected this argument and found that the facts re-
counted above “establish[ed] an administration directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons . . . that . . . [it] amount[ed] to a
practical denial by the [s]tate of that equal protection of the laws.”80
73. Id.
74. Wo Lee, 26 F. at 476.
75. Id. at 471, 474.
76. Id. at 477.
77. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368–69.
78. Id. at 369.
79. Authorities and Argument for Defendant and Respondent, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1885
WL 18153, at *95 (1885) (Nos. 1280, 1281).
80. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373.
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The Court thus found that an ordinance, neutral on its face, could be
applied in a manner that violated the Equal Protection Clause.81
Though Yick Wo had argued that the law itself violated the Con-
stitution, the Court did not make clear if the law was to be struck
down in ordering Yick Wo and Wo Lee to be freed.  Early in the opin-
ion, the Court suggested that the ordinance was deficient because
“[t]he power given to . . .  [the supervisors] is not confided to their
discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to their mere
will.  It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance nor re-
straint.”82  While the Court does not opine directly on the sufficiency
of the ordinance, following its suggestion leads to the conclusion that
evidence regarding discriminatory enforcement of a law may be suffi-
cient to strike down the entire law.  This may be particularly true if
there is a factual record that suggests that the discretion granted to
enforce the ordinance was, in essence, a license to discriminate.  This
understanding of Yick Wo became crucial in my litigation of the 14th
Amendment in an Arizona courtroom, as recounted below.
But Yick Wo and the Court’s application of the 14th Amendment
to safeguard the rights of persons of Asian ancestry were later under-
cut because of the incomplete protection provided by the Citizenship
Clause.  The opening sentence of the clause, in section one of the 14th
Amendment, states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.”83  Importantly,
this ensures that anyone with national citizenship, whether acquired
through birth or naturalization, also acquires state citizenship,
preventing states from denying state citizenship to black people and
others and discriminating on that basis.  But what does the qualifying
clause “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” mean?
The meaning of those words was tested when Wong Kim Ark,
born in 1873 in San Francisco, left the United States to visit China in
1894 and was denied entry upon his return to the United States in
1895.84  Despite the fact that Wong’s papers included a certification by
white men that he had been born in the United States, the collector of
customs decided that Wong was not a U.S. citizen and was barred
81. Id. at 373–74.
82. Id. at 366–67.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
84. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 652–53 (1898).
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from entry based on the Chinese Exclusion Act.85  Wong Kim Ark
sued, and his case made it to the Supreme Court.  A divided Court
determined that the Citizenship Clause meant that a person born in
the United States and whose parents were not consular officials of a
foreign government was, by virtue of birth, a U.S. citizen.86
Wong Kim Ark was silent, though, as to “persons . . . natural-
ized.”87  The amendment itself was silent as to who may become a
citizen through naturalization.  Likewise, the Constitution is silent on
this issue other than stating that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”88  Under this authority,
Congress passed the 1790 Naturalization Act, which limited the privi-
lege to “free white persons.”89  Following the Civil War and the Re-
construction Amendments, Congress revised the Act to permit “white
persons and . . . [persons] of African nativity . . . [or] descent” the right
to naturalize.90
But for those who fell outside of those categories, a federal gov-
ernment not bound to provide equal protection was free to determine
that some do not belong.  If persons of Asian ancestry may be banned
from United States shores, then it follows that good reason exists to
also exclude persons of Asian ancestry from joining the national polit-
ical body as citizens.  Nothing could be done, following Wong Kim
Ark, about pesky birthright citizenship.  But the harm could at least
be limited by forbidding naturalization, either explicitly by statute as
accomplished with Chinese immigrants, or by statutory interpretation
and reliance on racial categories as accomplished by the Court in
Ozawa v. United States91 and United States v. Thind.92  Then, to the
extent that birthright citizenship is a problem, the strategy shifts to
prevent births by severely restricting immigration to prevent family
formation.  As one Congressman said in support of the Immigration
Act of 1924, which was intended to foreclose immigration from Asia
completely through the use of the facially race- and nationality-neu-
85. Id. at 650, 653.
86. Id. at 705.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
89. U.S. REV. STAT. § 2169.
90. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 190, 193 (1922).
91. Id. at 176, 190, 193 (holding that a person of Japanese ancestry could not become natu-
ralized because he was not a “free white person”).
92. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding that “a high-caste Hindu, of full
Indian blood” must have his certificate of citizenship canceled because he was not a “free white
person”).
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tral legal category, alien ineligible for citizenship: “The necessity [for
this provision] . . . arises from the fact that we do not want to establish
additional Oriental families here.”93  Another technique used to re-
strict family formation was through anti-miscegenation laws.94
In this sense, the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause was in-
complete, because it left open the possibility that certain people could
be deemed ineligible for naturalization by race or nationality.  This
would not be corrected for Chinese immigrants until World War II,
when the imperatives of war produced the political will to open natu-
ralization to those from China, a U.S. ally.95  It was corrected for Fili-
pino immigrants and South Asian immigrants in 1946, and for all
immigrants from Asia in 1952 with the passage of the McCarran-Wal-
ter Act.96  Opening up the pathway to naturalization, though, should
not be confused with opening the borders for entry. During the mid-
20th century, most Asian countries had yearly quotas capped at 100
immigrants per year.97  To provide context, the quota for calendar
year 1963 for the following countries was as follows: Austria, 1,450;
Germany, 26,533; Ireland, 6,054; Poland, 7,460; and United Kingdom,
28,291.98  Europe as a region had a quota allotment that year of
99,244.99  All of Asia, 2,256; all of Africa, 1,010.100  In this way, the
(mostly) white national character of this nation was maintained, at
least for a little while longer.  Asian exclusion, for the most part,
persisted.
Further, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th
Amendment, which prevents states from treating citizens of other
states in a discriminatory manner, only protects citizens of the United
States.101  Immigrants from Asia ineligible for naturalization could
never bring themselves under the protection of this clause.
The incomplete Citizenship Clause had repercussions far beyond
the denial of naturalization.  Once the federal government recognized
93. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 235 (alteration in original).
94. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (laws banning interracial marriage);
Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving Racial Identity: Population Patterns and the
Application of Anti-miscegenation Statutes to Asian Americans, 1910–1950, 9 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2002).
95. CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT, repeal, PUB. L. 78-199, 57 STAT. 600 (1943).
96. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, PUB. L. 82-414, 66 STAT. 163 (1952).
97. LUCE–CELLER ACT, PUB. L. 483.
98. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., DEP’T JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 34 (1964).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
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“alien ineligible for citizenship” as a category that justified treating
Asians differently from other immigrants, states began relying upon
that federal classification to discriminate.  States such as California
and Washington enacted alien land laws, whose constitutionality was
upheld in a series of cases in 1923.102  In the Washington case, Terrace
v. Thompson, the Supreme Court found that because the category
“aliens ineligible for citizenship” was one created by Congress, the
state could rely upon the federal category which “in and of itself, fur-
nishes a reasonable basis for classification in a state law withholding
from aliens the privilege of land ownership.”103  Stated differently,
federal discrimination underwrote and authorized state discrimina-
tion, notwithstanding that due process and equal protection were sup-
posed to extend to all persons under the 14th Amendment.
In this manner, the 14th Amendment’s promise contained in the
expansive protections to all persons ended up being a mixed bag for
Asian Americans.
LITIGATING THE 14TH AMENDMENT IN ARIZONA
It is easy to be critical of 14th Amendment jurisprudence.  But
you need to move beyond critique if you find yourself in court litigat-
ing on behalf of clients who claim that their 14th Amendment rights
have been violated.  Representing students who challenged a state law
that was used to terminate the Mexican American Studies Program at
the Tucson Unified School District (“TUSD”) changed my relation-
ship with the 14th Amendment.104
The Mexican American Studies Program at TUSD was created in
1998.105  Controversy about the program erupted in 2006 when
Dolores Huerta, who had co-founded the National Farmworkers As-
sociation with Cesar Chavez, spoke at an assembly at Tucson High
Magnet School.106  When asked by students about anti-immigrant leg-
islation, she responded that Republicans hate Latinos.107  The Arizona
102. See Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) (upholding California’s Alien Land Law);
see also Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding Washington’s Alien Land Law).
103. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 220.
104. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015); González v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948
(D. Ariz. 2017).
105. Abena Hutchful, What You Need To Know About The Arizona Mexican-American
Studies Trial; Update: Judge Rules Ban Unconstitutional, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP
(Aug. 23, 2017), https://ncac.org/news/blog/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-arizona-mexican-
american-studies-trial.
106. González, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 952.
107. Id.
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state legislature learned of this and trouble ensued.  Then-State Su-
perintendent of Public Instruction Tom Horne accompanied his dep-
uty, Margaret Garcia Dugan, who was to speak at the school.108  Her
message was plain and simple — she was Latina, she was a Republi-
can, and she did not hate herself.109  Some students at this assembly
engaged in a silent protest because they had been informed before the
assembly that they would not be permitted to ask questions of the
speaker.110  The protesting students placed blue tape over their
mouths, stood up, and left the assembly.111  The tape had a double
message that was intended to symbolize the current silencing as well
as the historical suppression of spoken Spanish in Arizona public
schools.112  School administrators in the Southwest had used a variety
of punishments historically to punish students who spoke Spanish at
school, including placing tape over their mouths.113
Tom Horne was seated on stage when this occurred.
Horne responded first with an open letter to the Tucson commu-
nity published in a local newspaper.114  Without evidence, he blamed
the silent student protest on the Mexican American Studies Program
and called for its citizens to end ethnic studies at TUSD.115  When this
open letter failed to produce his desired result, Horne turned to the
Arizona legislature, testifying before key committees and drafting bills
that would empower the state superintendent, a position he occupied,
to effectively terminate ethnic studies courses and classes in Arizona’s
public schools.116  Though his first two attempts failed, he succeeded
on his third try, and the Arizona legislature passed House Bill (“HB”)
2281, which then-Governor Jan Brewer signed into law in May
2010.117  In January 2012, rather than lose 10% of its funding, TUSD





112. See Patricia Gándara & Gary Orfield, A Return to the “Mexican Room”: The Segrega-
tion of Arizona’s English Learners, UCLA (July 8, 2010), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/re-
search/k-12-education/language-minority-students/a-return-to-the-mexican-room-the-
segregation-of-arizonas-english-learners-1/gandara-return-mexican-room-2010.pdf.
113. AIDA HURTADO & PATRICIA GURIN, CHICANA/O IDENTITY IN A CHANGING U.S. SOCI-
ETY, ¿QUIÉN SOY? ¿QUIÉNES SOMOS? 93 (2004).
114. Id. at 953.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 954.
117. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2015).




In April 2012, when I found myself in the National Archives in
front of that talismanic document, I had just become co-counsel in
Arce v. Douglas, representing Maya Arce, Nicholas Dominguez, and
Korina Lopez, three TUSD students who challenged HB 2281, argu-
ing that it violated the 14th Amendment, its enactment and/or en-
forcement was motivated by discriminatory intent, and it was
overbroad.  A month earlier, before my role was formalized, I had
taken students in my civil rights clinic to Arizona to help the students’
attorney, Richard Martinez, prepare for a summary judgment hearing.
The student-plaintiffs had moved for summary judgment on their 1st
Amendment claims; the state cross-moved for summary judgment on
those claims.119  Though the students had also alleged an equal protec-
tion violation, that claim was not part of the summary judgment
proceedings.120
We waited nearly a year for the judge to rule.
Though the judge found one portion of the statute to be unconsti-
tutionally overbroad, the judge granted summary judgment to the
state on all of the students’ 1st Amendment claims.121  Then, in a
move that shocked us, the judge, on his own motion, granted summary
judgment to the State on the students’ equal protection claims, even
though neither the students nor the State had sought summary judg-
ment on these claims.122
We were shocked by the judge’s ruling because it is unusual, as a
matter of both procedural and substantive fairness, to rule on a claim
not raised by the parties in a summary judgment proceeding.  We were
also shocked because we had excellent facts demonstrating selective
enforcement.  Though Horne had railed against the evils of all ethnic
studies programs, and HB 2281 was drafted in general terms that did
not single out Mexican American Studies, the only program targeted
for enforcement was TUSD’s Mexican American Studies, even though
TUSD also had programs in Pan Asian Studies, African American
Studies, and Native American Studies.123  Further, one of the chief
complaints made by then-Superintendent Horne in testifying before
the legislature about the Mexican American Studies Program was its
use of work by Paolo Freire, an educational theorist who was also a




123. González v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948, 957–58 (D. Ariz. 2017).
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Brazilian Marxist.124  When a legislator brought to Horne’s attention
that there was a public charter school in Tucson called the Paolo
Freire Freedom School, Horne responded that he was “very con-
cerned”125 and would look into it, but never did.126  That school con-
tinued operating with no repercussions while TUSD’s Mexican
American Studies Program was shut down.  Most of the students tak-
ing MAS courses were Mexican American; most of the students at the
Paolo Freire Freedom School were white.127
This looked a lot like Yick Wo: a facially neutral law was being
applied in a discretionary manner that discriminated against people of
color — in this case, Latinx students.
To be fair to the judge, he had seen and heard part of the student
plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments because the students had sought
a preliminary injunction, arguing that they had a strong likelihood of
success on their equal protection claims.128  And the judge had the
authority to grant summary judgment on equal protection if he felt
that the issue had been fully and fairly argued.  Perhaps the judge felt
that he had seen and heard enough.
Our task, though, was to appeal and persuade the Ninth Circuit
that our equal protection claims had not been fully and fairly heard
and that we deserved an opportunity to present them to the trial
court.129  We also made other First Amendment arguments based on
overbreadth and void for vagueness that could have won the case out-
right.130  Though we were unable to persuade the panel on those theo-
ries, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment on
equal protection and viewpoint discrimination.131  Further, the court
directed that a trial was required on equal protection.132  This was un-
usual.  Typically, appellate courts will remand cases for further pro-
ceedings, which would have left it open for the parties to seek
summary judgment on equal protection or would have permitted the
124. Id. at 955.
125. Transcript at 100–01, Hearing on H.B. 2281 Before H. Educ. Comm., 49th Leg., 2nd
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
126. Id. at 955–56.
127. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2015); González, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 955.
128. Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 14, Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d
968 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 4:10-cv-00623-AWT).
129. Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ Response and Reply Brief at 12, Arce v. Doug-
las, 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-15657, 13-15760).
130. Id. at 21.




court, on its own motion, to direct the parties to brief the issue for
summary adjudication.
It was now summer 2015, with three years lost because of the
improper grant of summary judgment.  Discovery in this case had
stalled pending the resolution of summary judgment and its appeal, so
we were now headed into a very time-intensive and expensive phase
of discovery as part of pretrial preparation.  In September 2015, we
were extremely fortunate when attorneys in the New York office of
Weil, Gotshal & Manges joined as co-counsel.133
Yick Wo was an important case for us to draw parallels to, though
I did not fully appreciate how important it was initially.  Part of the
problem was that the facts in Yick Wo were so extreme — all of the
more than 200 Chinese laundry operators who sought permission to
operate were denied; all of the more than 80 non-Chinese laundry op-
erators, with the exception of the hapless Mrs. Mary Meagles, were
granted permission.  Here, we had only one affirmative instance of
enforcement, coupled with instances of lack of enforcement.  Was this
going to be enough to persuade the judge that our facts presented a
Yick Wo style of discriminatory enforcement?  And even if we pre-
vailed on that basis, would that be enough to get the statute tossed?
Our clients had pursued both a facial and an as-applied challenge
to the law.134  Success on the facial challenge would have invalidated
HB 2281.  The as-applied challenge, if successful, would have invali-
dated the enforcement but would leave the law in place.
It is extremely difficult to invalidate a facially-neutral law on
equal protection grounds.  Our research had shown that the last time
the Supreme Court upheld the invalidation of a facially neutral state
statute had been in 1985.135  In that case, Hunter v. Underwood, the
Court found that a race-neutral Alabama state constitutional provi-
sion adopted in 1901 had been motivated by an intent to disen-
franchise black citizens, as evidenced in part by the opening address
made by John Knox, president of the state constitutional convention:
“And what is it we want to do? Why it is, within the limits imposed by
the Federal Constitution, to establish white supremacy in this
133. Though additional lawyers from the firm worked on the case, the primary attorneys
were Weil partners Steve Reiss and James Quinn and associates Luna Ngan Barrington and
David Fitzmaurice.
134. See Pls. Pretrial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 1, González v.
Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948 (D. Ariz. 2017).
135. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
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State.”136  But 1901 was very different from 2010.  What could be
openly expressed in Alabama then was very different from what legis-
lators express now.  Discriminatory motivation has become more diffi-
cult to discern and prove today.
The 10-day bench trial took place in June and July 2017.  Because
of the 4th of July holiday and the judge’s schedule, we had a two-week
break in the middle of the trial.  One morning in the lead up to the
second week of trial, Steve Reiss, the lead trial attorney, looked over
at me and with a wry smile on his face said, “This is Yick Wo.”  One of
the Weil associates, David Fitzmaurice, and I looked at each other.  I
am not sure what David was thinking, but I was thinking, “Yes, we’ve
been citing to that case since our appellate briefs. Our case is and isn’t
Yick Wo, which only gets us so far.”  I am not sure why I did not say
this aloud. Perhaps it was the Cheshire Cat-like grin on Steve’s face.
It is only two years later, as I reflect on the 14th Amendment that
I realize how right he was.  I had been reading Yick Wo too narrowly,
thinking of it as an as-applied selective enforcement challenge, which
typically invalidates the discriminatory enforcement action but leaves
the statute in place.  But a close reading of the case shows that the
Court treated it as more than that.  The Court understood the chal-
lenge as follows:
It is contended on the part of the petitioners that the ordinances for
violations of which they are severally sentenced to imprisonment
are void on their face as being within the prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and, in the alternative, if not so, that they are
void by reason of their administration, operating unequally so as to
punish in the present petitioners what is permitted to others as law-
ful, without any distinction of circumstances — an unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is claimed, which, though not made expressly by
the ordinances, is made possible by them.137
The Court rejected the direct facial challenge, finding that regu-
lating businesses is generally within a municipality’s police powers.138
But the Court appears to have accepted what might be described as an
indirect facial challenge where the ordinances in question might be
found to be “void by reason of their administration.”139  This reading
of Yick Wo is supported by the Court’s characterization of the chal-
136. Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, May 21,
1901 to September 3, 1901, p. 8 (1940) (quoted in Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229).
137. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (emphasis added).




lenged ordinances: “They seem intended to confer, and actually do
confer, not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the
circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or
withhold consent.”140  The Court adds that “[t]he power given to them
is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is
granted to their mere will.  It is purely arbitrary and acknowledges
neither guidance nor restraint.”141
This notion of an indirect facial challenge is supported by the
Court’s discussion of Yick Wo 13 years later.  The Court described
how it had come to the conclusion that the San Francisco laundry or-
dinance was “adjudged void”: “[t]his court looked beyond the mere
letter of the ordinance to the condition of things as they existed in San
Francisco, and saw that under the guise of regulation an arbitrary clas-
sification was intended and accomplished.”142
Though we may not have consciously developed our trial strategy
to follow Yick Wo, in retrospect, we did precisely that.  We asked the
court to look beyond the mere letter of HB 2281 to the conditions that
existed in Tucson and throughout Arizona.  Those conditions showed
that an arbitrary classification, disfavoring Latinx students, was in-
tended and accomplished despite the stated policy of the statute
(which the student plaintiffs did not challenge) “that public school
pupils should be taught to treat and value each other as individuals
and not be taught to resent or hate other races or classes of
people.”143
Intent with regard to enactment, though, is extremely difficult to
prove.  Other than John Huppenthal, who played a dual role as a state
senator who supported and voted in favor of the bill and as state su-
perintendent of public instruction who later enforced the statute, we
did not call legislators to testify about their state of mind when they
enacted HB 2281.  Other than providing in briefs to the court some of
what they expressed in legislative hearings, it would have been fool-
hardy to call legislators to testify given the scope of legislative privi-
lege.  Instead, we had to get at enactment inferentially. Yick Wo’s
inferential approach is consistent with the modern Court’s inferential
140. Id. at 366.
141. Id. at 366–67.
142. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 105 (1899) (discuss-
ing Yick Wo).
143. H.B. 2281, 54 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Az. 2017).
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approach as expressed in the much more often cited Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation.144
Initially as drafted, HB 2281 gave enforcement authority to the
state superintendent of public instruction.145  One lawmaker, con-
cerned that this gave too much unconstrained power to one individual,
amended the bill to instead give enforcement authority to the state
board of education.146  Huppenthal provided a key amendment that
the state board and the state superintendent had co-equal enforce-
ment power.147  Then, he added an amendment that delayed when the
statute would go into effect until the start of the next calendar year.148
Huppenthal was already running for the office of state superintendent
when he supplied these amendments.149  He won that elected office,
and as state superintendent, he found TUSD in violation of the statute
and imposed a fine resulting in a loss to the district of 10 percent of
state funding until TUSD eliminated the Mexican American Studies
Program.150
There is a telling phrase from Yick Wo that aptly describes what
we were trying to show the judge about the Arizona statute: “In fact,
an Ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power,
hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pro-
nounce it inoperative and void.”151  It also turned out that the individ-
ual clothed with this power in Arizona had, during his time as state
senator and as state superintendent, been blogging anonymously, say-
ing such things as:
No Spanish radio stations, no Spanish billboards, no Spanish TV
stations, no Spanish newspapers.  This is America, speak English.
The rejection of American values and the embracement of the val-
ues of Mexico in La Raza classrooms are the rejection of success
and the embracement of failure.
I don’t mind them selling Mexican food as long as the menus are
mostly in English.152
144. Vill. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
145. González v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948, 955 (D. Ariz. 2017).
146. Id. at 955
147. Id. at 957.
148. Id. at 956.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 958, 962.
151. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (quoting City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md.
217, 231 (1878) (emphasis in original).
152. González v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948, 957–58 (D. Ariz. 2017) (citations omitted).
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Taken together, though there was no direct evidence that a ma-
jority of the legislators harbored animus against Mexican Americans
when they voted for HB 2281, the evidence permitted the court to
look beyond the mere letter of the statute to the condition of things as
they existed in Tucson and throughout Arizona to conclude that,
under the guise of regulation, an arbitrary classification was intended
and accomplished.153  The statute gave Superintendent Huppenthal a
license to discriminate.154  The statute fell outside of the domain of
law.  The judge found that the statute had been enacted and enforced
in violation of our clients’ 14th Amendment equal protection rights.155
Steve Reiss was right.  Our case was Yick Wo.  Too often, Yick
Wo operates at the margins as an exceptional case because it is
thought to present such a stark factual pattern where impact alone is
determinative.156  Instead, it should be more prominent in our 14th
Amendment equal protection playbook that permits full consideration
of discriminatory enforcement located within the local and historical
context that supports the ultimate conclusion (and remedy) that the
challenged law is void by reason of administration.
THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND THE NEXT GENERATION
OF LAWYERS
Litigating the 14th Amendment gave me a newfound apprecia-
tion for the amendment.  It took me from armchair critic to active
engagement.  This experience has made me wonder how we can make
the 14th Amendment live for our students.  Perhaps we can draw our
inspiration from how Charles Hamilton Houston made the 14th
Amendment come alive for students such as Thurgood Marshall.
153. Id. at 966–67 (finding that MAS had been implemented as part of a remedial effort to
redress de jure discrimination in the school district; “the statute was enacted to target a single
educational program in use in a single school district in Arizona” which was “probative of dis-
criminatory intent”; finding that several statements by legislators and supporters of the bill re-
flected racial animus; and finding that “Horne, Huppenthal, and other officials used code words
to refer to Mexican Americans in a derogatory way”).
154. One of Huppenthal’s amendment restored enforcement authority to the superinten-
dent, a position he was seeking; the other delayed the effective date of the statute so that if he
won that office, he would have enforcement authority. After he took office as superintendent, he
then proceeded to act on his animus. Id. at 968 (discussing Huppenthal’s blog comments as
providing “the strongest evidence that racial animus motivated the enforcement” of the statute).
155. Id. at 972.
156. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (noting that
cases such as Yick Wo are rare where impact alone is determinative).
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The film Simple Justice157 opens with a young Marshall blowing
off steam with fellow classmates who are about to begin their studies
at Howard Law School.  As they are playing dice, Charles Hamilton
Houston walks by and expresses his displeasure with this activity.  As
he walks away, Marshall asks who that was, and he is told that it is the
dean of the law school and that his nickname is “Iron Shoes.”  The
nickname is never really explained, but the viewer is left to guess that
it refers to Dean Houston being a difficult taskmaster.158
The scene then cuts to the classroom, with Marshall seated in the
front.  Dean Houston asks Marshall where he is from.  He answers,
“Baltimore,” then repeats his answer rolling the “o” and “r” in a
working-class Baltimore accent.159  Though it gets laughs from a num-
ber of his classmates, Dean Houston is not amused.  Houston asks,
“Why are you paying, Mr. Marshall, to attend our little Howard Law
School and not going tuition-free to the prestigious University of Ma-
ryland?”160  Marshall responds, sarcastically, “I happen to be a Ne-
gro.”161  After a little more back and forth, Dean Houston asks why
Negroes do not attend Maryland.162  When students are unable to an-
swer, perhaps because they perceived it as an unchangeable social fact
that, as articulated by Marshall, “Negroes don’t attend Maryland,”
and which therefore must be accepted, Houston walks to the chalk-
board, on which is written “Plessy v. Ferguson”163 and underlines
“Plessy.”  After a brief colloquy with various students about the case,
Dean Houston states:
Plessy, Mr. Hill, is why you ride from Richmond, Virginia, in a ra-
cially segregated train. Plessy, Mr. Durham, is why no one in this
room can eat in most of the restaurants here, in the capital of the
world’s greatest democracy.  And Plessy, Mr. Marshall, is the reason
it is against the law in 17 states for black children to go to school
with white children.
157. SIMPLE JUSTICE (New Images Productions, Inc. 1993) (based on the first edition of
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976)).
158. Other nicknames for Dean Houston included “iron pants” and “cement shoes,” “which
suggested the same image of a stern taskmaster.” Jack Greenberg, In Tribute: Charles Hamilton
Houston, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2161, 2161 (1998).




163. Id. This was a reference to Plessy v. Ferguson, which enshrined the doctrine of “separate
but equal.” See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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There are two kinds of lawyers, gentlemen.  There are my kind, and
there are parasites on society.  My kind of lawyer is going to be a
social engineer, my kind of lawyer is going to be a fighter for social
change.  My kind of lawyer is going to find out everything there is to
know about Plessy, because Plessy is a dragon, gentlemen, and my
kind of lawyer is going to go out and slay it.  That’s why you’re here,
Mr. Marshall, or it had better be, and if it’s not, you better pack up
and leave, because you will not make it.164
Later classroom scenes show students arguing the ins and outs of
the 14th Amendment and what it says or does not say about the doc-
trine of separate but equal enshrined in Plessy.  When one student
refers to that amendment but is unable to recite it, Marshall comes to
the rescue and paraphrases, “No state shall make or enforce any law
which abridges the privileges of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.”165 You
can see Houston start warming to Marshall.  Likewise, you can see
Marshall blossom.
Though most law students are familiar with Thurgood Marshall
and have at least a passing awareness of his role in Brown166 and his
role as the first African American to sit on the Supreme Court, most
know nothing of Charles Hamilton Houston.167  Those who do know
of Houston know that he is rightfully credited with formulating the
legal strategy to dismantle Jim Crow segregation,168 but even this does
not capture the depth of Houston’s social justice vision.  Houston
knew that winning in the courts was not enough.  He appreciated that
he needed to have a cadre of black civil rights attorneys to carry out
the fight for equality with him and who would carry on the fight after
164. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 157.
165. Id. The full text of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment states: All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2–3.
166. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896)).
167. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., notes that “[m]ost colleges and law schools give stu-
dents no exposure to the black heroes in the law who built the foundation for the later success of
blacks in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.” Foreword, GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1984).
168. E.g., Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935) (challenging the jury panel on the basis
that black citizens were excluded from jury service); see also Mo. ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that it was unconstitutional for law schools to reject students on the
basis of race).
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him.169  When he saw that schools were not producing this cadre of
black civil rights attorneys,170 Houston decided to transform Howard
Law School so that its graduates would be equipped not only to enter
private practice right away, because racism made clerkship opportuni-
ties scarce, but also to ensure that its graduates would be trained con-
sistent with his vision:
[The] Negro lawyer must be trained as a social engineer and group
interpreter.  Due to the Negro’s social and political condition . . . the
Negro lawyer must be prepared to anticipate, guide and interpret
his group advancement . . . [Moreover, he must act as] business ad-
viser . . . for the protection of the scattered resources possessed or
controlled by the group . . . He must provide more ways and means
for holding within the group the income now flowing through it.171
Houston, as Vice-Dean of Howard Law School, worked tirelessly
in the classroom and as an administrator to bring about this vision.172
It was in this capacity that Houston encountered Thurgood Marshall.
It was in this capacity that he molded Marshall.
It would be hubris for me to think that the Korematsu Center for
Law and Equality, founded in 2009 at the Seattle University School of
Law, could ever hope to accomplish what Charles Hamilton Houston
did at Howard Law School.  Nevertheless, what Houston accom-
plished provides a model, and the Korematsu Center draws inspira-
tion and lessons from Houston, especially through the Korematsu
Center’s Civil Rights Clinic.
169. Biographer Genna Rae McNeil writes that he gained an appreciation during law school
“that if it were not for teachers and scholars, the law might never be more than precedent —
judgments confirming the correctness of earlier judgments.” MCNEIL, supra note 167, at 63.
170. Houston sought to continue his law studies to get a Doctor of Juridical Science degree
(J.S.D.) so that he would be able to fulfill his vision:
My reasons for desiring graduate work are both personal and civic . . . a deep desire for
further study in the history of the law and comparative jurisprudence . . . [and the belief
that] there must be Negro lawyers in every community . . . the great majority [of which]
must come from Negro schools . . . [where] the training will be in the hands of Negro
teachers. It is to the best interest of the United States . . . to provide the best teachers
possible.
Id. at 48.
171. Id. at 69 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, “Personal Observations on the Summary
of Studies in Legal Education as Applied to the Howard University School of Law”).
172. Leland Ware credits Houston for transforming Howard Law School “from an unac-
credited evening program to a laboratory for Civil Rights litigation.” Leland B. Ware, Setting the
Stage for Brown: The Development and Implementation of the NAACP’s School Desegregation
Campaign, 1930–1950, 52 MERCER L. REV. 631, 633 (2001); see also Robert L. Carter, A Tribute
to Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 33, 36 (1991) (describing Thurgood Marshall’s legal
education, Judge Carter characterized “[t]he overriding theory of legal education at Howard
during those years was that the United States Constitution — in particular, the Civil War
Amendments — was a powerful force, heretofore virtually untapped, that should be used for
social engineering in race relations.”).
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Launched in 2012, the Civil Rights Clinic was intended, initially,
to be a clinic that focused on amicus advocacy.173  The reasons for this
were manifold.  Amicus advocacy is particularly well-suited to a one-
semester clinic, because, with careful case selection, students can be-
gin and end a project, drafting and filing an amicus brief, in the course
of one semester.  Another reason is that amicus advocacy is particu-
larly well-suited for academic settings because there can be greater
freedom in presenting historical context, social science, and arguments
that may allow a court to appreciate the consequences of its decision
that extend beyond how it affects the immediate litigants before it.174
Related to the last point is that amicus advocacy can have the
beneficial effect of democratizing the courts.175  In a sense, courts are
a supremely antidemocratic institution.  Litigants appear before a
court and the tribunal may issue a ruling that affects countless others
aside from the litigants.  These countless others, unless they are able
to intervene,176 have no voice in the litigation.  Amicus briefs, though,
offer a way for the voiceless to have a say in the litigation.177
An amicus curiae brief, formally a “friend of the court” brief, can
serve various functions.  They can help judge and justices appreciate
the impact of their decisions; they can provide valuable contextual in-
formation in the form of so-called Brandeis briefs;178 and they can
give voice for those who are otherwise shut out of the particular
litigation.179
Students working in the clinic are able to contribute in ways that
bring the law to life.  In the clinic, we teach our students to be social
engineers in the sense espoused by Houston: “A social engineer was a
173. Ethnic studies case heads to trial in Tucson, SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. L. (June 21, 2017),
https://law.seattleu.edu/newsroom/2017-news/ethnic-studies-case-heads-to-trial-in-tucson.
174. See Robert S. Chang, The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality and Its Vi-
sion for Social Change, 7 STANFORD J. C.R. & C. L. 197 (2011); Robert S. Chang & Karin Wang,
Democratizing the Courts: How an Amicus Brief Helped Organize the Asian American Commu-
nity to Support Marriage Equality, 14 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L. J. 22 (2009); Ruben J. Garcia,
A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2008).
175. See Chang & Wang, supra note 174.
176. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (Intervention).
177. See also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Adam Feldman, Separating Amicus Wheat from the
Chaff, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 136 (2017).
178. A “Brandeis brief” refers to a brief that relies on non-legal data, such as scientific or
social science information, rather than legal citations. Future Supreme Court Justice Louis Bran-
deis submitted the first of such briefs as a lawyer before the Court in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908), a case involving the constitutionality of limiting hours for female laundry workers.
179. See Chang & Wang, supra note 174; Bruhl & Feldman, supra note 177 at 137; Garcia,
supra note 174 at 342; see also Stephen G. Masciocchi, What Amici Curiae Can and Cannot Do
with Amicus Briefs, 46 COLORADO LAWYER 23 (April 2017).
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highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer who understood the Consti-
tution of the United States and knew how to explore its uses in the
solving of ‘problems of . . . local communities’ and in ‘bettering condi-
tions of the underprivileged citizens.’”180
Houston fully understood the challenges to using the 14th
Amendment to overcome segregation.  Nevertheless, he persisted:
“As he explained to his students, discrimination, injustice, and the de-
nial of full citizenship rights and opportunities on the basis of race and
a background of slavery could be challenged within the context of the
Constitution if it were creatively, innovatively interpreted and
used.”181  The film Simple Justice shows him drilling his students inces-
santly on the ins and outs of the 14th Amendment.182
This bore fruit when his former student, Thurgood Marshall, with
his LDF team, persuaded the Court that Plessy v. Ferguson was
wrongly decided.
CONCLUSION
Today, we can draw inspiration from Houston.  We can make the
14th Amendment come alive for our students by showing them that
despite the roadblocks placed by courts to limit the reach of the 14th
Amendment, the amendment and its guarantees remain vibrant, vital.
As it was in Houston’s day, the 14th Amendment is what we make of
it.
We ought not, we cannot, give up on the 14th Amendment.
180. GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 84–85 (2011).
181. Id. at 84.
182. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 157.
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